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Notes 
RETHINKING JANUS: PRESERVING PRIMARY-




  The Securities and Exchange Commission relies heavily on the 
securities laws’ antifraud provisions in fulfilling its role as watchdog 
of the U.S. securities markets. But the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders has frustrated 
the SEC’s efforts to keep fraud at bay. There the Court drastically 
narrowed the scope of actors who can qualify as primary participants 
in misrepresentations perpetrated in connection with the purchase or 
sale of securities under Rule 10b-5(b). This Note argues that Janus’s 
holding creates an incongruence in the SEC’s ability to enforce the 
securities laws’ misrepresentation provisions, with the SEC’s ability to 
prosecute misrepresentations now varying depending on the stage of 
securities dealings at which the misrepresentation occurred. This 
result runs counter to the SEC’s purpose in creating Rule 10b-5 and to 
Congress’s desire that the SEC enjoy broad authority to pursue 
fraudsters. This Note analyzes solutions for curing this incongruence, 
including the SEC’s recent bid for judicial deference to its 
interpretations of the relevant regulations and statutes. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or the 
Commission) has long been the primary overseer of the U.S. 
securities markets. Among the most important regulatory tools at the 
Commission’s disposal are the provisions targeting fraudulent 
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conduct perpetrated at the various stages of securities dealings. These 
primary antifraud provisions, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 
1933 (Securities Act)1 and Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 (Exchange Act),2 deal, respectively, with fraudulent 
activities occurring in the “offer and sale” of a security, and those 
occurring in subsequent “purchase or sale” of a security on secondary 
markets, such as the New York Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ. 
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Janus Capital Group, Inc. 
v. First Derivative Traders,3 however, the SEC is at risk of having an 
incongruent ability to prosecute fraudsters depending on the stage of 
securities dealings at which their actions took place. 
In Janus, the Supreme Court limited the scope of actors who can 
be held liable as primary participants under SEC Rule 10b-5(b),4 
promulgated under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, for making 
materially misleading statements or omissions in connection with the 
purchase or sale of a security.5 In addressing a Rule 10b-5(b) claim 
brought by private litigants under Rule 10b-5’s implied private right 
of action, the Court held that to “make” an untrue statement within 
the meaning of Rule 10b-5(b) requires having “ultimate authority 
over the statement, including its content and whether and how to 
communicate it.”6 
Janus’s “ultimate authority” rule has bred uncertainty regarding 
the SEC’s ability to pursue primary participants under the federal 
securities antifraud provisions. This uncertainty stems mainly from 
the fact that Janus involved a suit brought under Rule 10b-5’s implied 
private right of action.7 In such cases, the Court consistently interprets 
 
 1. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2) (2012). 
 2. Id. § 78j(b). For an overview of the Exchange Act’s enactment, see generally Steve 
Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 
385 (1990). 
 3. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011).  
 4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2015). Rule 10b-5(b) makes it 
unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any 
national securities exchange . . . [t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or 
to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the 
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. 
Id. 
 5. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302 (holding that misstatement liability under Rule 10b-5(b) is 
proper only for those with “ultimate authority over the statement, including its content and 
whether and how to communicate it”).  
 6. Id.  
 7. Id. at 2299. 
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securities laws restrictively to give “narrow dimensions . . . to a right 
of action Congress did not authorize when it first enacted the 
statute.”8 The SEC, by contrast, enjoys Congress’s explicit blessing to 
bring enforcement suits against those who violate the securities laws, 
including Rule 10b-5.9 The Court’s approach to implied private rights 
of action under these securities laws therefore raises the question of 
whether Janus was meant to interpret what “make” means only in the 
context of private securities litigation under Rule 10b-5,10 or whether 
the Court’s interpretation was meant to apply with equal force to the 
SEC.11 But concluding that Janus applies to SEC enforcement actions 
brought under Rule 10b-5(b) only raises the question of why the 
Court interpreted “make” in the manner it did—by relying on 
precedents that do not affect the SEC. This Note offers an 
explanation for the Court’s methodology by considering the SEC’s 
intentions in promulgating Rule 10b-5 and Congress’s reactions to 
other judicial interpretations in implied private-right-of-action suits. 
This Note also takes a fresh look at whether Janus should apply 
to other theories used by the SEC to target misrepresentations: 
enforcement actions brought under Section 17(a)(2) and those 
brought via a scheme-liability theory under Rule 10b-5(a) and (c). 
Section 17(a)(2), like Rule 10b-5(b), provides the SEC with the ability 
to prosecute actors for misrepresentations. But two differences are 
significant. First, Section 17(a)(2) prohibits misrepresentations “in the 
offer and sale of securities,” and does not apply to the 
postdistribution purchase of securities on the secondary markets, 
which is Rule 10b-5(b)’s domain. Second, rather than prohibiting 
“mak[ing] any untrue statement of a material fact,”12 as Rule 10b-5(b) 
does, Section 17(a)(2) prohibits “obtain[ing] money or property by 
 
 8. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 167 (2008). 
 9. See generally Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78kk 
(2012) (establishing the SEC’s broad enforcement authority of securities laws). 
 10. See Donald C. Langevoort, Lies Without Liars? Janus Capital and Conservative 
Securities Jurisprudence, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 933, 941 (2013) (arguing that in Janus “we are 
being told what ‘make’ means in the context of private securities litigation under Rule 10b-5, 
leaving open how it is to be construed in the context of public enforcement”). 
 11. See Bryan P. King, The Effects of an Undefined “Ultimate Authority” Standard for Rule 
10b-5 Claims: Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 16 N.C. BANKING INST. 405, 
430 (2012) (“While the SEC has wider authority to bring suits under Rule 10b-5 than individuals 
in private actions, the Court did not provide one definition of the word ‘make’ for private 
actions, and a separate definition for SEC actions.”). 
 12. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2015). 
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means of any untrue statement of a material fact.”13 Given, however, 
that both provisions are designed to perform the same function, just 
at different stages of securities dealings,14 many scholars have 
questioned whether Janus’s narrow interpretation of Rule 10b-5(b) 
also applies to Section 17(a)(2). Janus’s application, if any, to Rule 
10b-5(a) and (c) scheme-liability claims also warrants attention given 
that not applying the ultimate authority rule to such claims could 
allow the SEC to prosecute the conduct Rule 10b-5(b) forbids while 
avoiding Janus’s constraints. Congress’s approach to the scope of the 
federal securities laws provides additional insight into Janus’s reach 
by exposing Congress’s preferences regarding the appropriate scope 
of the SEC’s power to enforce the antifraud provisions. 
This Note proceeds in four Parts. Part I focuses on the relevant 
statutory background for Janus and the precedents invoked to 
support the ultimate authority rule. Part II analyzes the Janus opinion 
itself and the various factors motivating the Court’s formulation of 
the ultimate authority rule. Part III analyzes Janus’s impact on the 
various theories by which the SEC can target misrepresentations, 
including a Rule 10b-5(b) enforcement action, a scheme-liability 
theory via Rule 10b-5(a) and (c), and a Section 17(a)(2) enforcement 
action. These inquiries show that applying Janus to SEC enforcement 
actions under Rule 10b-5(b) creates an incongruence between the 
SEC’s ability to prosecute actors for misrepresentations in connection 
with the purchase of securities under Rule 10b-5(b) and those in 
connection with the offer of securities under Section 17(a)(2). Part IV 
proposes solutions to this gap, including the SEC’s recent bid to 
secure judicial deference for its interpretations concerning Janus’s 
reach. 
I.  JANUS’S ROOTS: THE SECURITIES LAWS’ ANTIFRAUD PROVISIONS 
AND PRIVATE-ACTION JURISPRUDENCE 
Understanding Janus and appreciating its implications for the 
SEC’s enforcement authority requires a grasp of both the relevant 
statutory provisions and the precedent used to support the Court’s 
holding. This Part first describes the securities laws’ antifraud 
provisions, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act15 and Section 10(b) of 
 
 13. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2) (2012). 
 14. See infra notes 131–32 and accompanying text. 
 15. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2) (2012). 
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the Exchange Act,16 and their key differences. It then introduces the 
private-action precedent the Court relied on in Janus to interpret 
“make” in Rule 10b-5. 
A. The Securities Laws’ Antifraud Provisions 
The Securities Act regulates the offer and sale of securities. The 
Act’s antifraud provision, Section 17(a), makes it unlawful to engage 
in certain conduct at this stage of securities dealings. Section 17(a)(1) 
prohibits “employ[ing] any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.”17 
Section 17(a)(2), the misrepresentation provision, prohibits 
“obtain[ing] money or property by means of any untrue statement of 
a material fact or any [material] omission.”18 And Section 17(a)(3) 
prohibits “engag[ing] in any transaction, practice, or course of 
business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon 
the purchaser.”19 
The Exchange Act regulates the trading of securities on 
secondary markets20 and seeks to eliminate abuses in trading of 
securities after their initial distribution.21 Section 10(b) of the 
Exchange Act22 is the key antifraud provision of the federal securities 
laws applying to postdistribution trading. This Section authorizes the 
SEC23 to promulgate antifraud rules that proscribe the use of “any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance” “in connection with 
the purchase or sale of any security.”24 The Commission used this 
 
 16. Id. § 78j(b). 
 17. Id. § 77q(a)(1). 
 18. Id. § 77q(a)(2). 
 19. Id. § 77q(a)(3). 
 20. Robert M. Lawless, Stephen P. Ferris & Bryan Bacon, The Influence of Legal Liability 
on Corporate Financial Signaling, 23 J. CORP. L. 209, 218 (1998) (“[T]he 1934 Act governs the 
trading of securities in the secondary markets, such as the New York Stock Exchange or the 
NASDAQ.”). 
 21. Combatting fraud in the secondary securities markets is the primary focus of the 
Exchange Act. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881, 881 (1934) 
(describing the Exchange Act’s purpose as to “prevent inequitable and unfair practices on such 
exchanges and markets”).  
 22. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).  
 23. Id.; see also id. § 78w(a) (stating that the Commission has the “power to make such 
rules and regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to implement the provisions of this 
chapter for which they are responsible or for the execution of the functions vested in them by 
this chapter”). 
 24. Id. § 78j(b). In its entirety, Section 10(b) makes it unlawful  
to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on 
a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, or any securities-
based swap agreement[,] any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in 
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grant to create Rule 10b-5,25 which over time became the “primary 
private remedy for fraud available under the Securities Exchange 
Act.”26 This Rule implements the Commission’s authority under 
Section 10(b) in three ways. Rule 10b-5(a) prohibits “employ[ing] any 
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.”27 Rule 10b-5(b), the 
misrepresentation provision at issue in Janus, prohibits “mak[ing] any 
untrue statement of a material fact or [omitting] to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the statements made . . . not 
misleading.”28 Finally, Rule 10b-5(c) prohibits “engag[ing] in any act, 
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a 
fraud or deceit upon any person.”29 
The format and language of Rule 10b-5 bears a striking 
resemblance to that of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, and for 
good reason. Indeed, “the SEC’s ‘only purpose’ in adopting Rule 10b-
5 was to make the same prohibitions contained in Section 17(a)—
which applies in connection with the ‘offer and sale’ of a security—
applicable to ‘purchasers’ of securities as well.”30 If Rule 10b-5 was 
intended to essentially apply Section 17(a) to purchasers of securities 
on secondary markets, should Janus’s interpretation of Rule 10b-5 be 
imported to Section 17(a)? 
B. Janus’s Private-Action Precedent 
The Court has been consistent in giving “narrow dimensions . . . 
to a right of action Congress did not authorize when it first enacted 
the statute.”31 This desire to constrain the scope of liability under the 
implied right of action guided the Court’s interpretation of Rule 10b-
5(b)’s “make” in Janus.32 Indeed, the two cases the Court relied on to 
 
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.  
Id. 
 25. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2015). 
 26. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 12.3[1] (6th ed. 2009). 
 27. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a). 
 28. Id. § 240.10b-5(b). 
 29. Id. § 240.10b-5(c). 
 30. SEC v. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d 340, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing Birnbaum v. Newport 
Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir. 1952); SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 855 
(2d Cir. 1968)).  
 31. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 167 (2008). 
 32. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2303 (2011) (“Our 
holding accords with the narrow scope that we must give the implied private [right of action].” 
(citing Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 167)). 
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reach its holding in Janus—Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First 
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.33 and Stoneridge Investment Partners, 
LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.34—were responsive to concerns present 
solely in claims brought under implied private rights of action. 
1. Restricting Aiding-and-Abetting Liability: Central Bank of 
Denver.  In Central Bank, the Supreme Court held for the first time—
while addressing a suit brought under Section 10(b)’s implied private 
right of action—that liability under Section 10(b) does not extend to 
aiders and abettors.35 From the outset the Court stressed the type of 
action at issue, asking the parties to address a question not presented 
in the petition: “Whether there is an implied private right of action 
for aiding and abetting violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b–5.”36 In answering this 
question, the Court narrowed the scope of liability under Section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 on two grounds: the statutory language and 
concerns for aider-and-abettor liability’s impact on the element of 
reliance that private plaintiffs must prove. 
Addressing the statutory language, the Court emphasized that 
“the text of the statute controls,” and thus “the private plaintiff may 
not bring a 10b-5 suit against a defendant for acts not prohibited by 
the text of Section 10(b).”37 Because the statute’s “proscription does 
not include giving aid to a person who commits a manipulative or 
deceptive act,” the Court reasoned that liability under Section 10(b) 
does not extend to aiders and abettors.38 Second, and though the 
Court’s focus on the statute’s text apparently binds the SEC to the 
same degree it does private plaintiffs,39 the Court buttressed its 
 
 33. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 
(1994). 
 34. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008). 
 35. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 177. The SEC defines aiders and abettors as those who 
“provide[] substantial assistance to another person in violation of a provision of this chapter, or 
of any rule or regulation issued under this chapter.” 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2012).  
 36. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 508 U.S. 959, 959 
(1993) (mem.). 
 37. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 173; see also id. at 177 (“It is inconsistent with the settled 
methodology in § 10(b) cases to extend liability beyond the scope of conduct prohibited by the 
statutory text.”). 
 38. Id. at 177.  
 39. Justice Stevens voiced this very concern in his dissent: 
[T]his case concerns only the existence and scope of aiding and abetting liability in 
suits brought by private parties under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The majority’s 
rationale, however, sweeps far beyond those important issues. The majority leaves 
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holding by referencing a concern attendant only upon private actions. 
Significantly to the Court, that Section 10(b) liability does not reach 
aiders and abettors necessarily follows from the need to preserve the 
requirement that private plaintiffs “show reliance on the defendant’s 
misstatement or omission to recover under 10b-5.”40 That is, because 
an aider and abettor has not “engaged in such a proscribed act, but 
merely assisted in its commission, to permit recovery against such a 
defendant would allow the plaintiff to circumvent the reliance 
requirement which the Court has repeatedly held was a part of the 
plaintiff’s case.”41 The Court therefore concluded that aiding-and-
abetting liability was improper because “the defendant could be liable 
without any showing that the plaintiff relied upon the aider and 
abettor’s statements or actions.”42 
2. The Reliance Requirement: Stoneridge Investment Partners.  In 
Stoneridge, the Court granted certiorari to resolve the circuit split 
regarding “when, if ever, an injured investor may rely upon § 10(b) to 
recover from a party that neither makes a public misstatement nor 
violates a duty to disclose but does participate in a scheme to violate 
§ 10(b).”43 The plaintiff sued Scientific Atlanta, Inc. (Scientific-
Atlanta) for participating in a scheme to violate Section 10(b),44 
alleging that Scientific-Atlanta entered into fraudulent contracts with 
Charter Communications, Inc. (Charter) that helped Charter inflate 
 
little doubt that the Exchange Act does not even permit the SEC to pursue aiders and 
abettors in civil enforcement actions under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 
Id. at 199–200 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Joel Seligman, The Implications of Central Bank, 
49 BUS. LAW 1429, 1435 (1994) (stating that “it appears highly probable that the lower courts 
will conclude that the logic of Central Bank equally applies to SEC and private aiding and 
abetting claims under [S]ection 10(b)”). 
 40. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 180 (citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 242 (1988)). A 
private plaintiff bringing a Section 10(b) and/or Rule 10b-5 action must establish the following: 
“(1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection 
between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance 
upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.” Stoneridge 
Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157 (2008).  
 41. James D. Cox, Just Desserts for Accountants and Attorneys After Bank of Denver, 38 
ARIZ. L. REV. 519, 520 (1997); see also Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 180 (“[The plaintiff’s] argument 
would impose 10b-5 aiding and abetting liability when at least one element critical for recovery 
under 10b-5 is absent: reliance. . . . Allowing plaintiffs to circumvent the reliance requirement 
would disregard the careful limits on 10b-5 recovery mandated by our earlier cases.”). 
 42. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 180. 
 43. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 156. 
 44. Id. at 155. 
GAUGHT IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/22/2015  6:15 PM 
2015] RETHINKING JANUS 535 
its revenue and operating cash flow.45 Charter then included this 
inflated number on financial statements filed with the SEC and 
reported to the public46 financial statements that Scientific-Atlanta 
had no hand in preparing or disseminating.47 Scientific-Atlanta’s own 
financial statements listed the transactions in accordance with 
generally accepted accounting principles.48 
In its decision, the Court addressed the issue solely in terms of 
the reliance element of the plaintiff’s cause of action.49 The Court 
reiterated that “[r]eliance by the plaintiff upon the defendant’s 
deceptive acts is an essential element of the § 10(b) private cause of 
action.”50 But nothing Scientific-Atlanta did “made it necessary or 
inevitable for Charter to record the transactions as it did.”51 In such 
circumstances, “the investors cannot be said to have relied upon any 
of [Scientific-Atlanta’s] deceptive acts in the decision to purchase or 
sell securities,” and primary liability under Section 10(b) was 
therefore inappropriate.52 Following its methodology in Central Bank, 
the Court displayed a desire to prevent expansion of the implied 
private right of action and invoked various policy considerations in 
support of its holding.53 Its inquiry again focused on policy concerns 
attendant only to suits brought under the implied private right of 
action.54 For example, expanding the scope of liability would “expose 
a new class of defendants to [the] risks” of frivolous lawsuits brought 
to extort settlements.55 
 
 45. Id. at 153–55.  
 46. Id. at 155. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 159 (holding that “respondents’ acts or statements were not relied upon by the 
investors, and that, as a result, liability cannot be imposed upon respondents” (emphasis 
added)). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 161. 
 52. Id. at 166–67.  
 53. See id. at 167 (“This conclusion is consistent with the narrow dimensions we must give 
to a right of action Congress did not authorize when it first enacted the statute . . . .”); see also 
id. at 165 (“Concerns with the judicial creation of a private cause of action caution against its 
expansion. The decision to extend the cause of action is for Congress, not for us. Though it 
remains the law, the § 10(b) private right should not be extended beyond its present 
boundaries.”). 
 54. See id. at 161–64 (describing the policy concerns). 
 55. Id. at 163–64.  
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Central Bank and Stoneridge significantly influenced the creation 
of the ultimate authority rule in Janus56 and helped chart the course 
the Court has subsequently followed in narrowly defining the scope of 
primary-participant liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 
Janus, in narrowing the scope of primary-participant liability under 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in an implied private-right-of-action 
case, is but the Court’s most recent tapering of private rights of action 
under the securities laws. 
II.  THE JANUS DECISION AND ULTIMATE AUTHORITY 
In Janus, the Court followed the path set forth in Central Bank 
and Stoneridge and once again limited the scope of actors who can be 
held liable as primary participants under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5. As in those cases, concerns for preventing the expansion of the 
implied private right of action guided the Court’s holding. The Court 
interpreted “make” in Rule 10b-5(b) such that only the person or 
entity with “ultimate authority over the statement, including its 
content and whether and how to communicate it” can be liable under 
the provision.57 
A. Factual Background 
Janus Capital Group created multiple mutual funds, one of 
which, Janus Investment Fund—a separate entity owned by mutual-
fund investors—retained Janus Capital Group’s wholly owned 
subsidiary, Janus Capital Management, as its investment advisor.58 
Janus Investment Fund issued multiple prospectuses to its investors 
that “represented that the funds were not suitable for market 
timing”59 and could have been “read to suggest that [Janus Capital 
 
 56. See Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302–03 (2011) 
(describing the support the “ultimate authority” rule finds in Central Bank and Stoneridge). 
 57. Id. at 2302. 
 58. Id. at 2299. 
 59. Market timing is a trading strategy that exploits time delay in a mutual fund’s daily 
valuation system. Disclosure Regarding Market Timing and Selective Disclosure of Portfolio 
Holdings, 68 Fed. Reg. 70,402, 70,403–04 (proposed Dec. 17, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 
pt. 239). Due to time delays, the values underlying calculations of the fund’s net asset value 
(NAV) do not always accurately reflect the true value of the underlying assets. Id. Thus, if an 
event were expected to increase the price of a foreign security, an investor engaging in market 
timing could buy shares of a mutual fund at an artificially low NAV and sell the following day 
when the NAV corrects upward. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2300 n.1 (citing Disclosure Regarding 
Market Timing and Selective Disclosure of Portfolio Holdings, 68 Fed. Reg. at 70,403–04).  
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Management] would implement policies to curb the practice.”60 But 
New York’s Attorney General filed a complaint against Janus Capital 
Group and Janus Capital Management alleging that the former 
agreed to permit market timing in several funds controlled by the 
latter.61 First Derivative Traders, representing a class of Janus Capital 
Group stockholders, subsequently brought a suit alleging that Janus 
Capital Group and Janus Capital Management violated Section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5.62 
B. The Ultimate Authority Rule 
Justice Thomas framed the issue as “whether [Janus Capital 
Management] can be held liable in a private action under Rule 10b-5 
for false statements included in Janus Investment Fund’s 
prospectuses.”63 Because Rule 10b-5(b) makes it unlawful “[t]o make 
any untrue statement of a material fact” in connection with the 
purchase or sale of securities,64 imposing liability required finding that 
Janus Capital Management “‘made’ the material misstatements in the 
prospectuses.”65 But before delving into this issue, Justice Thomas 
paid homage to Stoneridge by acknowledging the narrow construction 
the Court must give to Rule 10b-5’s implied private right of action.66 
The Court first looked to the dictionary to determine whether 
Janus Capital Management “made” the untrue statements in the 
prospectuses.67 The Court concluded that “[t]o make any . . . 
statement” within the meaning of Rule 10b-5(b) means “to state.”68 
And “[f]or purposes of Rule 10b-5, the maker of a statement is the 
person or entity with ultimate authority over the statement, including 
its content and whether and how to communicate it.”69 Without such 
 
 60. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2300.  
 61. Id.  
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 2301. 
 64. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2015). 
 65. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2301. 
 66. Id. at 2302 (stating that “we are mindful that we must give ‘narrow dimensions . . . to a 
right of action Congress did not authorize when it first enacted the statute and did not expand 
when it revisited the law’” (quoting Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 
552 U.S. 148, 167 (2008))). 
 67. Id. (consulting the Oxford English Dictionary).  
 68. Id.  
 69. Id.  
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“ultimate authority,” the defendant could only suggest what to say, 
not “make” the statement.70 
Departing from the dictionary, the Court argued that the 
ultimate authority rule necessarily followed from Central Bank’s 
holding “that Rule 10b-5’s private right of action does not include 
suits against aiders and abettors.”71 Though the SEC is expressly 
authorized to bring suits against entities that contribute “substantial 
assistance” to the making of a statement but do not actually make it, 
private parties cannot.72 From this the Court reasoned that 
interpreting “make” broadly as “including persons or entities without 
ultimate control over the content of a statement” would undermine 
the limits placed on the implied private right of action in Central 
Bank by rendering aiders and abettors virtually nonexistent.73 
Justice Thomas found further support in Stoneridge for the 
Court’s narrow interpretation of “make.”74 In Stoneridge, the 
complaint was dismissed in view of the fact the plaintiffs could “not 
have relied on the entities’ undisclosed deceptive acts”75 because—
significantly to Justice Thomas—“nothing [the defendants] did made 
it necessary or inevitable for [the company] to record the transactions 
 
 70. Id. Contributing to the confusion stemming from Janus, it is unclear from this language 
whether “the Court [is] construing the Rule, or just the right of action.” Langevoort, supra note 
10, at 938 (emphasis added). That is, although the opinion focused on defining a specific word in 
Rule 10b-5, the Court repeatedly called attention to the private nature of the action at issue and 
stressed the “narrow dimensions” it must be given. The implication being that if the Court was 
interpreting the Rule, then the SEC is bound by the “ultimate authority” rule. If, however, the 
Court was interpreting the right of action, then the SEC’s enforcement authority is unaffected.  
 71. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302 (emphasis added) (citing Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First 
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 180 (1994)). 
 72. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2012)). The U.S. Code provides that  
any person that knowingly or recklessly provides substantial assistance to another 
person in violation of a provision of this chapter, or of any rule or regulation issued 
under this chapter, shall be deemed to be in violation of such provision to the same 
extent as the person to whom such assistance is provided. 
15 U.S.C. § 78t(e).  
 73. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302. Despite the Court’s allusion to a broader aiding-and-abetting 
enforcement power in SEC actions than exists in private actions, it is worth noting that if Janus’s 
ultimate authority rule applies to SEC actions, the Commission’s aiding-and-abetting authority 
would likewise be narrowed. After all, an aider and abettor cannot exist without a primary 
violator. And Janus undoubtedly limits the pool of those who can be considered primary 
participants. 
 74. See id. at 2303 (stating that “[t]his interpretation is further supported by our recent 
decision in Stoneridge”). 
 75. Id. (citing Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 166–
67 (2008)). 
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as it did.”76 Without ultimate authority over a statement “it is not 
‘necessary or inevitable’ that any falsehood will be contained in the 
statement.”77 
Interestingly, Justice Thomas used the principle of narrowing, or 
at least not expanding, the scope of the implied private right of action 
as bookends for the rule’s formulation. Indeed, in his last argument in 
support of the Court’s interpretation of “make” he noted that the 
“holding also accords with the narrow scope that [the Court] must 
give the implied private right of action.”78 At the outset, Justice 
Thomas acknowledged that the Court “must give ‘narrow 
dimensions . . . to a right of action Congress did not authorize when it 
first enacted the statute.’”79 He further observed that “[c]oncerns with 
the judicial creation of a private cause of action caution against its 
expansion.”80 Bookending its interpretation of “make” in this manner 
further clouds whether “the Court [was] construing the Rule, or just 
the private right of action.”81 
Janus’s ultimate authority rule greatly narrows the class of 
individuals who can be deemed primary participants in a 
misrepresentation under Rule 10b-5(b). This rule resulted largely 
from the Court’s desire to give continuing force to its holdings in 
Central Bank and Stoneridge. Thus, Janus and its ultimate authority 
rule are properly viewed as the Court’s most recent effort to curb 
expansion of the judicially created implied private right of action. The 
Court did not make clear, however, the limits of Janus’s reach. 
III.  THE SEC’S INCONGRUENT ANTIFRAUD ENFORCEMENT 
AUTHORITY POST-JANUS 
Janus raises three questions regarding the ultimate authority 
rule’s applicability to SEC enforcement actions. The first is whether 
the ultimate authority rule applies to Rule 10b-5(b) misrepresentation 
actions brought by the SEC, or is instead cabined to those that are 
brought by private plaintiffs under the implied private right of action. 
If Janus binds the SEC in Rule 10b-5(b) enforcement actions, then 
the scope of actors who can be held liable in such actions has been 
 
 76. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 161). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. (citing Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 167). 
 79. Id. at 2302 (quoting Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 167). 
 80. Id. (quoting Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 165). 
 81. Langevoort, supra note 10, at 938. 
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narrowed. As a result, the Commission’s power to prosecute 
misrepresentations perpetrated in connection with the purchase of a 
security on the secondary markets has been drastically reduced.82 The 
second is whether the SEC can avoid Janus’s narrowing effect on 
Rule 10b-5(b) claims by using scheme liability under Rule 10b-5(a) 
and (c) to prosecute conduct that cannot meet the ultimate authority 
test. Finally, the third is whether the ultimate authority rule also 
applies to Section 17(a)(2) misrepresentation actions brought by the 
SEC since both Rule 10b-5(b) and Section 17(a)(2) were intended to 
serve the same purpose, just at different stages of securities dealings.83 
Finding that Janus applies to Rule 10b-5(b) but not Section 17(a)(2) 
would mean that the SEC now has less ability to prosecute 
misrepresentations perpetrated in connection with the purchase of 
securities than in the offer of those same securities. 
A. Janus’s Impact on the SEC’s Ability to Prosecute Fraud 
Perpetrated in Connection with the Purchase of Securities: Section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5(b) 
At the threshold, the nontextual considerations underlying the 
Court’s interpretation of Rule 10b-5(b) in Janus do not apply to SEC 
enforcement actions brought under the same provision. The Court 
left multiple hints rendering it plausible that Janus can be interpreted 
differently depending on who brings the action. For starters, the 
Court’s own framing of the issue at hand was whether the defendant 
“can be held liable in a private action under . . . Rule 10b-5.”84 And 
following its articulation of the ultimate authority rule, the Court 
approvingly noted that its “holding accords with the narrow scope 
that we must give the implied private right of action.”85 It therefore 
would appear that the Court was interpreting the meaning of “make” 
as it applies specifically in private actions.86 
 
 82. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2015) (stating that the proscribed fraudulent activity must be 
“in connection with the purchase or sale of any security”). 
 83. See SEC v. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d 340, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (stating that “the SEC’s 
‘only purpose’ in adopting Rule 10b-5 was to make the same prohibitions contained in Section 
17(a)—which applies in connection with the ‘offer and sale’ of a security—applicable to 
‘purchasers’ of securities as well” (citing Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463 
(2d Cir. 1952); SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 855 (2d Cir. 1968)). 
 84. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2299. 
 85. Id. at 2303. 
 86. See Langevoort, supra note 10, at 941 (“For all these reasons . . . we are being told what 
‘make’ means in the context of private securities litigation under Rule 10b-5, leaving open how it 
is to be construed in the context of public enforcement.”).  
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Perhaps more telling in this regard is the Court’s effort to 
demonstrate the ultimate authority rule’s consistency with prior 
holdings designed to preserve requirements applicable only to actions 
brought by private parties. The concerns regarding various aspects of 
transaction causation—that is, reliance87—that guided the Court’s 
decisions in Central Bank and Stoneridge fit poorly with SEC 
enforcement actions in which causality is not a predicate to 
establishing a violation.88 Further, in SEC actions there need not be 
any concern that “a broader reading of ‘make’ . . . would substantially 
undermine Central Bank[’s]” prohibition on aiding-and-abetting 
liability89 because the SEC enjoys Congress’s explicit blessing to bring 
suits against aiders and abettors under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.90 
Thus, reading “make” more broadly when the SEC is the plaintiff 
would not upset Central Bank’s holding that “Rule 10b-5’s private 
right of action does not include suits against aiders and abettors.”91 
Similarly inapplicable to SEC actions is the Court’s concern that 
without the ultimate authority requirement reliance could be 
bypassed because “it is not ‘necessary or inevitable’ that any 
falsehood will be contained in the statement.”92 Liability could not be 
imposed in contravention of Stoneridge’s “necessary or inevitable” 
reliance-driven requirement when the SEC is the plaintiff because, 
again, the SEC need not prove such elements. 
That Janus’s ultimate authority rule “follows from” holdings that 
do not even affect the SEC’s enforcement authority,93 and that were 
significantly influenced by the need to preserve a requirement that 
the SEC is not required to prove, lends further credence to the 
argument that the Court was construing “make” within the realm of 
private securities litigation.94 
 
 87. Because reliance has long been conceptualized as requiring “but for” causation, the 
reliance requirement has been alternatively termed transaction causation. Donald C. 
Langevoort, Reading Stoneridge Carefully: A Duty-Based Approach to Reliance and Third-
Party Liability Under Rule 10b-5, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2125, 2131 n.20 (2010).  
 88. See HAZEN, supra note 26, § 12.10 (“Reliance is an element of a private suit under Rule 
10b-5, but not in enforcement actions brought by the government.”). 
 89. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302  
 90. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 104, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2012); see 
also Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302 (“Such [aiding-and-abetting] suits may be brought by the SEC.”). 
 91. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302 (emphasis added). 
 92. Id. at 2303. 
 93. Id. at 2302 (stating that the ultimate authority rule “follows from” Central Bank). 
 94. See Langevoort, supra note 87, at 2127–28 (stating in his analysis of Stonebridge that 
the “Court’s choice of reliance as the crucial element indicates the Court’s comfort with having 
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Additionally, the policy concerns that lead the Janus Court to 
acknowledge the “narrow scope” it must give the implied private 
right of action are nonexistent when the SEC is the plaintiff. One 
chief driver behind the Court’s desire to avoid expanding the scope of 
liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is that private litigation 
under these provisions “presents a danger of vexatiousness different 
in degree and in kind from that which accompanies litigation in 
general.”95 Expanding the scope of liability under Rule 10b-5 presents 
more occasion for nuisance or strike suits—“meritless suits brought 
by class action plaintiffs’ lawyers to extort settlement and attorneys’ 
fees”96—a concern present only when private parties are the 
plaintiffs.97 This concern has influenced the Court’s interpretation of 
Rule 10b-5 as far back as 1975, when in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor 
Drug Stores98 the Court cited this concern to support limiting standing 
in private Rule 10b-5 suits to actual “purchasers” or “sellers” within 
the definitions of the Exchange Act.99 Central Bank echoed this 
concern in restricting the scope of Rule 10b-5 by interpreting Section 
10(b) as not permitting liability for aiders and abettors,100 as did 
 
different liability outcomes in Rule 10b-5 cases depending on whether the action is an SEC 
enforcement or criminal prosecution (where reliance is not required) or private litigation 
(where it is)”). 
 95. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 189 
(1994) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739 (1975)). 
 96. Amanda M. Rose, Life After SLUSA: What Is the Fate of Holding Claims?, 69 DEF. 
COUNS. J. 455, 455 (2002). The Court articulated this threat in Blue Chip Stamps: 
[E]ven a complaint which by objective standards may have very little chance of 
success at trial has a settlement value to the plaintiff out of any proportion to its 
prospect of success at trial so long as he may prevent the suit from being resolved 
against him by dismissal or summary judgment. The very pendency of the lawsuit may 
frustrate or delay normal business activity of the defendant which is totally unrelated 
to the lawsuit. 
Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 740. 
 97. See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 740 (expressing concern for “the danger of vexatious 
litigation which could result from a widely expanded class of plaintiffs under Rule 10b-5,” 
including the “potential for nuisance or ‘strike’ suits”).  
 98. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).  
 99. Id. at 748–49; see also Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: 
Restructuring The Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108 
COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1320 (2008) (noting that the Court’s decision in Blue Chip Stamps to 
“deny[] standing to enforce Rule 10b-5 to nonpurchasers and nonsellers of securities . . . was 
explicitly motivated by a concern about ‘strike suits’”). 
 100. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 188–90 (expressing that private litigation under Rule 10b-5 
presents “a danger of vexatiousness” (quoting Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 739) and “requires 
secondary actors to expend large sums even for pretrial defense and the negotiation of 
settlements”). 
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Stoneridge.101 This anti-strike-suit justification for narrowing the scope 
of who can be prosecuted as a primary participant, however, does not 
support limiting the SEC’s enforcement authority because, notably, 
the SEC lacks the attorneys’ fee incentives that encourage strike suits 
in the first place.102 
Finally, the additional policy considerations of judicial restraint 
and legislative primacy, both of which influenced the Court’s 
decisions in the cases cited in support of Janus’s rule, are concerns 
unique to suits brought under the implied private right of action. As 
Stoneridge emphasized, “Concerns with the judicial creation of a 
private cause of action caution against its expansion. The decision to 
extend the cause of action is for Congress, not for us.”103 Even further, 
expanding the “implied private right of action” directly “conflicts 
with the authority of Congress under Art. III to set the limits of 
federal jurisdiction.”104 But these concerns dissipate when Congress 
has in fact expressly authorized the action,105 prompting the Fourth 
Circuit to note that “[e]xplicit congressional prohibitions simply 
operate in a different universe than the one inhabited by Janus.”106 
Indeed, the Court has not expressed similar skepticism against 
expansion of the SEC’s enforcement authority, which is expressly 
provided for under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.107 
 
 101. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 163–64 (2008) 
(listing the policy concerns supporting the Court’s interpretation, including that expanding the 
scope of Section 10(b)’s private right of action could extend its coverage into the realm of 
ordinary business operations, thus shifting securities offerings away from U.S. capital markets, 
and that “extensive discovery and the potential for uncertainty and disruption in a lawsuit could 
allow plaintiffs with weak claims to extort settlements from innocent companies”).  
 102. See SEC v. Steffes, F. Supp. 2d 601, 617 n.12 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (“Whereas private parties 
have a financial incentive to initiate ‘strike’ suits and drag deep-pocketed defendants into court 
on allegations of fraud in hopes of obtaining a lucrative settlement, the SEC’s statutory task is 
to protect the investing public by policing the securities markets and preventing fraud.” (quoting 
SEC v. Tambone, 550 F.3d 106, 119 (1st Cir. 2008))). 
 103. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 165 (citing Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 173; Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. 
Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1102 (1991)). 
 104. Id. at 164–65 (quoting Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 746–47 (1979) (Powell, J., 
dissenting)); see also id. at 164 (stating that expanding the scope of the implied private right of 
action “runs contrary to the established principle that the jurisdiction of the federal courts is 
carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation” (quoting Cannon, 441 U.S. at 
747)).  
 105. See Prousalis v. Moore, 751 F.3d 272, 278 (4th Cir. 2014) (analyzing the policy concerns 
of judicial restraint and legislative primacy that underlay Janus’s interpretation).  
 106. Id. 
 107. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u (2012) (giving the SEC authority to, among other things, initiate 
investigations into violation, and bring suit to enjoin “any person [who] is engaged or is about to 
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At least one court of appeals has used Janus’s reliance on 
private-action precedent to confine the ultimate authority rule to 
private actions. The Fourth Circuit directly addressed the 
applicability of Janus to nonprivate Rule 10b-5(b) misrepresentation 
claims, albeit in a unique context. In Prousalis v. Moore108 the Fourth 
Circuit held that a federal prisoner seeking habeas relief on the 
grounds that the conduct for which he was convicted is no longer 
criminal could not find refuge in Janus.109 Thomas Prousalis was a 
securities lawyer who pled guilty to securities fraud, including a Rule 
10b-5(b) misstatement claim.110 Following Janus, Prousalis sought 
habeas relief, contending that Janus rendered the conduct for which 
he was convicted no longer criminal because he did not “make” the 
false statements within the meaning of the ultimate authority rule.111 
The Fourth Circuit held that Janus’s interpretation of “make” was 
“inapplicable outside the context of the 10b-5 implied private right of 
action,” and therefore did not affect Prousalis’s criminal 
convictions.112 The Fourth Circuit overcame the fact that Janus’s 
holding rested significantly on a straightforward textual interpretation 
of “make” by noting that the meaning of even plain statutory 
language depends on “context.”113 To apply Janus’s definition of 
“make” outside the context present there “would render the Supreme 
Court’s discussion of private rights of action largely superfluous.”114 
 
engage in acts or practices constituting a violation of any provision of this chapter, the rules or 
regulations thereunder”); 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(a) (2015) (“The Commission may, in its discretion, 
make such formal investigations and authorize the use of process as it deems necessary to 
determine whether any person has violated, is violating, or is about to violate any provision of 
the federal securities laws . . . .”). Also, the SEC can, in its discretion, take one or more of the 
following actions: “Institution of administrative proceedings looking to the imposition of 
remedial sanctions, initiation of injunctive proceedings in the courts, and, in the case of a willful 
violation, reference of the matter to the Department of Justice for criminal prosecution.” Id. 
§ 202.5(b).  
 108. Prousalis v. Moore, 751 F.3d 272 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 109. Id. at 273. 
 110. Id. at 273–74. The U.S. Code subjects certain violators of Rule 10b-5 to criminal 
penalties. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (“Any person who willfully violates any provision of this 
chapter . . . or any rule or regulation thereunder the violation of which is made unlawful . . . shall 
upon conviction be fined not more than $5,000,000, or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or 
both . . . .”). 
 111. Prousalis, 751 F.3d at 275. 
 112. Id. at 276. 
 113. Id. at 277–78 (quoting King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991)). 
 114. Id. at 278. 
GAUGHT IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/22/2015  6:15 PM 
2015] RETHINKING JANUS 545 
The Fourth Circuit thus concluded that Janus was construing the 
private right of action, as opposed to the Rule itself.115 
Despite the Fourth Circuit’s framing of Janus and pervasive 
language to the contrary, history hints that Janus should not be read 
as limited to private litigation.116 Congress has acted swiftly in the past 
to “reestablish the SEC’s broader enforcement authority” following 
opinions that, like Janus, resulted from textual interpretations shaped 
by the desire to constrain the implied private right of action under 
Rule 10b-5.117 For example, following Central Bank’s dispensing of 
aiding-and-abetting liability in a private suit brought under Section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5, Congress in 1995 explicitly provided the SEC 
with the ability to prosecute such actors.118 Similarly, the Court’s 
holding in Morrison v. National Australia Bank119—another private-
right-of-action case—that Rule 10b-5 does not apply to transactions 
occurring outside the United States’ borders120 prompted Congress to 
provide the SEC with broader extraterritorial jurisdiction.121 Such 
reactions support two separate inferences, both leading to the same 
result: reading the Court’s textual interpretations in Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 implied private-action cases as applying to the SEC is 
nothing new. 
 
 115. Id.; see also Mary P. Hansen, Fourth Circuit Holds Supreme Court’s Janus Rule Not 
Applicable to Criminal Cases, NAT’L L. REV. (May 19, 2014), http://www.natlawreview.com/
article/fourth-circuit-holds-supreme-court-s-janus-ruling-not-applicable-criminal-cases [http://
perma.cc/BTQ2-4FAW] (“Given the Fourth Circuit’s reliance on the lack of any indication that 
the U.S. Supreme Court intended for Janus to extend beyond private actions, Prousalis may 
signal a victory not only for criminal prosecutors, but also for the SEC.”). 
 116. See Langevoort, supra note 10, at 939 (looking to historical cases to determine whether 
Janus can be limited to private actions). 
 117. Id.  
 118. See supra note 90. Congress’s preference for affording the SEC broader enforcement 
authority than that of private litigants is illustrated by the fact that former SEC Chairman 
Arthur Levitt testified before the Senate Securities Subcommittee, cited Central Bank, and 
recommended that aiding-and-abetting liability in private claims be established. Abandonment 
of the Private Right of Action for Aiding and Abetting Securities Fraud/Staff Report on Private 
Securities Litigation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., 
& Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 13–14 (1994) (statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, Securities 
and Exchange Commission) [hereinafter Private Right of Action Hearing]. 
 119. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 561 U.S. 247 (2010). 
 120. Id. at 273. 
 121. See generally Richard W. Painter, The Dodd-Frank Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 
Provision: Was it Effective, Needed or Sufficient?, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 195 (2011) (discussing 
in depth the Morrison decision and Congress’s response of broadening SEC extraterritorial 
jurisdiction through Section 929P of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act). 
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One explanation is that Congress’s quick nullification of the 
holdings in Central Bank and Morrison as applied to the SEC 
evidences Congress’s own acceptance that these holdings applied with 
equal force to the Commission. Another explanation is that Congress 
acted as it did due to the Court’s willingness in the past to extend its 
text-based holdings to the SEC. In this vein, Congress’s reactions 
represent its conclusion that the Court would likely apply these 
holdings to the SEC as well. This latter explanation finds support in 
the Court’s decision in Aaron v. SEC122 to extend its text-based 
holding in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder123 to SEC actions, thus 
requiring the SEC to prove in any Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
enforcement actions that the defendant acted with scienter.124 Either 
way, reading private-action cases with holdings based on textual 
interpretations—a class of which Janus is a member—“as not limited 
to private litigation, notwithstanding extensive language in the 
opinion to the contrary, may be becoming a habit.”125 This seems 
especially true given that the Court has not hesitated in the past to 
explicitly reserve the question of whether its textual interpretations in 
private actions apply to the SEC, as it did in Ernst & Ernst.126 
Indeed, that the SEC itself has conceded that Janus applies to 
SEC actions brought under Rule 10b-5(b) speaks to the weakness of 
arguments for its inapplicability.127 Thus, unless and until the SEC or 
Congress demonstrates that it did not intend for the SEC to be so 
 
 122. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980). 
 123. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).  
 124. Aaron, 446 U.S. at 701–02. The Court in Aaron described Ernst & Ernst as holding 
“that a private cause of action for damages will not lie under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in the 
absence of an allegation of scienter.” Id. at 689. And in Ernst & Ernst the Court expressly 
reserved the question of whether the SEC, like private plaintiffs, needs to prove scienter. See 
Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193 n.12 (“Since this case concerns an action for damages we also 
need not consider the question whether scienter is a necessary element in an action for 
injunctive relief under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”); see also Aaron, 446 U.S. at 685 (stating that in 
Ernst & Ernst, the Court “expressly reserved the question whether scienter must be alleged in a 
suit for injunctive relief brought by the Commission”). 
 125. Langevoort, supra note 10, at 939. 
 126. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193 n.12. 
 127. See, e.g., SEC v. Brown, 878 F. Supp. 2d 109, 122 (D.D.C. 2012) (noting the SEC’s 
concession that “as a result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Janus, the Second Claim for 
Relief against [the defendant] can no longer rest on violations of subsection Rule 10b-5(b)”); 
SEC v. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d 340, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“The SEC concedes that Janus 
foreclosed its ability to assert a misstatement claim under subsection (b) of rule 10b-5 against 
[the defendants].”); SEC v. Daifotis, No. C 11–00137 WHA, 2011 WL 3295139, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 
Aug. 1, 2011) (“[N]o one argues that claim one should be dismissed entirely as to either 
defendant after Janus.”). 
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bound,128 the Commission must deal with the narrow scope now given 
to its authority to pursue primary participants for misrepresentations 
perpetrated in connection with the purchase of securities on the 
secondary markets. 
In this regard, one plausible reason for the Court’s choice of 
interpretative methodology in Janus—relying on private-action 
precedent to narrowly interpret the text of a Rule equally applicable 
to the SEC—is that it sought to spur the SEC or Congress into 
clarifying its intent via amendment to Rule 10b-5(b).129 Such an 
approach would be in line with the Court’s decisions in Central Bank 
and Morrison, both of which were quickly followed by congressional 
action.130 
This explanation for Janus’s unusual methodology also makes 
sense considering the context of Rule 10b-5’s adoption. Indeed, “the 
SEC’s ‘only purpose’ in adopting Rule 10b-5 was to make the same 
prohibitions contained in Section 17(a)—which applies in connection 
with the ‘offer and sale’ of a security—applicable to ‘purchasers’ of 
securities as well.”131 As one of the Rule’s authors recounted about its 
creation: “I looked at Section 10(b) and I looked at Section 17, and I 
put them together, and the only discussion we had there was where 
‘in connection with the purchase or sale’ should be . . . .”132 If the SEC 
truly meant for Rule 10b-5(b) to serve the same function as Section 
17(a)(2) but in connection with the purchase of securities, it would 
not have intended Rule 10b-5(b) to cover a much narrower subset of 
 
 128. See infra Part IV (discussing actions the SEC or Congress can take to reinstate 
equilibrium in the former’s ability to prosecute fraudsters for misrepresentations occurring in 
the “offer and sale” of a security, and those occurring in subsequent “purchase or sale” of a 
security on the secondary markets). 
 129. See Langevoort, supra note 10, at 942 (“That may be the Court’s goal [in Janus], 
invoking something akin to a penalty default interpretation, like contra proferentem in contract 
law, simply to provoke the Commission or Congress to clarify its intent through an amendment 
to Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5.”). 
 130. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2012) (providing the SEC with authority to pursue aiders and 
abettors of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 violations post-Central Bank’s holding that private 
Section 10(b) suits do not reach aiding-and-abetting liability); id. § 78aa(b) (providing the SEC 
with broader extraterritorial jurisdiction after Morrison’s curbing of the territorial reach of the 
implied private right of action); see also Langevoort, supra note 10, at 942 (stating that if Janus 
is read as a penalty default interpretation to provoke Congressional or Commission action, then 
“[i]n this regard, Janus bears a substantial affinity to both Central Bank and Morrison, both of 
which did provoke a congressional response”). 
 131. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d at 345 (citing Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 
463 (2d Cir. 1952); SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 855 (2d Cir. 1968)). 
 132. Milton V. Freeman, Administrative Procedures, 22 BUS. LAW. 891, 922 (1967). 
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conduct than Section 17(a)(2).133 Thus, by interpreting “make” 
narrowly the Court could have been signaling that Congress or the 
SEC should take action to bring the SEC’s enforcement authority 
into equilibrium with regards to misrepresentations at the various 
stages of securities dealings. As it stands, “the Court is effectively 
saying in Janus . . . that ‘make’ was meant by the SEC to have a more 
restrictive meaning than what was in the statutory text from which the 
Rule was drawn,” which “is implausible given the context of the 
Rule’s adoption.”134 Moreover, as developed below, post-Janus the 
SEC has less ability to prosecute as primary participants those who 
utilize a misrepresentation in connection with the purchase of a 
security than those who do so in connection with the offer of a 
security. 
B. Circumventing Janus? Using Scheme Liability Under Rule 10b-
5(a) and (c) to Prosecute Fraud Perpetrated in Connection with 
the Purchase of Securities 
Such heavy emphasis on “make” necessarily raises the issue of 
whether, or to what extent, Janus is restricted to subsection (b) of 
Rule 10b-5. Can the SEC circumvent Janus’s ultimate authority rule 
by alleging that the misrepresentation is part of a larger fraudulent 
scheme under Rule 10b-5(a) and (c), each of which uses different 
verbs?135 Under such a theory, the SEC could “restructure [its] 
complaints to allege schemes to defraud or deceptive acts and 
practices rather than misrepresentations or omissions.”136 Since 
subsections (a) and (c) apply to the purchase of securities, such a 
tactic would curb Janus’s effect of drastically reducing the pool of 
available primary participants in misrepresentations perpetrated at 
that stage of securities dealings. 
Such tactics, however, are likely to fail, and indeed have failed. 
Even before Janus, lower courts “routinely rejected the SEC’s 
attempt[s] to bypass the elements necessary to impose ‘misstatement’ 
liability under subsection (b) by labeling the alleged misconduct a 
 
 133. See SEC v. Stoker, 865 F. Supp. 2d 457, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing SEC v. Tambone, 
550 F.3d 106, 127 (1st Cir. 2008)) (stating that Section 17(a)(2)’s language “plainly covers a 
broader range of activity” than does Rule 10b-5(b)).  
 134. Langevoort, supra note 10, at 940.  
 135. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a), (c) (2015). These verbs are “engage” and “employ,” 
respectively.  
 136. Langevoort, supra note 10, at 963. 
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‘scheme’ rather than a ‘misstatement.’”137 These courts were cognizant 
of the temptation to resort to “something akin to scheme liability to 
re-litigate issues foreclosed under a straightforward misrepresentation 
claim”138 and thus refused to allow subsections (a) and (c) to be used 
as a “back door into liability” for those who could not be proven to be 
primary participants in a misrepresentation under subsection (b).139 
This trend continued in the period after Janus. For example, the U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of New York declined to 
allow the SEC to avoid Janus by alleging scheme liability where the 
purpose and effect of the scheme was to make a public 
misrepresentation or omission.140 The SEC, finding no refuge in 
subsections (a) and (c), thus appears relegated to using Rule 10b-5(b) 
to pursue claims for misrepresentations made in connection with the 
purchase of securities. But the SEC has not gone silently into the 
night on this issue.141 
C. Janus’s Impact on the SEC’s Ability to Prosecute Fraud 
Perpetrated in Connection with the Offer of Securities: Section 
17(a)(2) of the Securities Act 
Post-Janus, an important incongruence has arisen with respect to 
the SEC’s authority to bring enforcement actions for 
misrepresentations in connection with the offer of securities under 
the Securities Act and in connection with the purchase of securities 
under the Exchange Act. This incongruence results from the 
 
 137. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d at 343; see also, e.g., Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 
177 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[W]here the sole basis for [market manipulation] claims is alleged 
misrepresentations or omissions, plaintiffs have not made out a market manipulation claim 
under Rule 10b–5(a) and (c) . . . .”); SEC v. Lucent Techs., 610 F. Supp. 2d 342, 359–61 (D.N.J. 
2009) (holding that the SEC “cannot breathe new life into the defunct primary liability claims” 
by asserting a scheme claim based on misrepresentations); SEC v. KPMG LLP, 412 F. Supp. 2d 
349, 377–78 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“Because the core misconduct is in fact a misstatement, it would 
be improper to impose primary liability on Yoho by designating the alleged fraud a 
‘manipulative device’ rather than a ‘misstatement.’”); SEC v. PIMCO Advisors Fund Mgmt., 
341 F. Supp. 2d 454, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (declining to find scheme liability where “the only 
allegations at issue relate to publication of material misrepresentations or omissions”). 
 138. Langevoort, supra note 10, at 965. 
 139. In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 376 F. Supp. 2d 472, 503 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); see also 
Langevoort, supra note 10, at 966 (stating that the courts that have considered the question held 
that “complaints about misrepresentations . . . must be treated as such, no matter which prong 
of the rule is invoked”). 
 140. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d at 343. 
 141. See infra Part IV.A (explaining the SEC’s recent interpretation of Rule 10b-5(a) and 
(c) scheme liability as permitting prosecution of misrepresentations that also fall within Rule 
10b-5(b)). 
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differences between Section 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act and Rule 
10b-5(b) promulgated under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.142 
Section 17(a)(2), like Rule 10b-5(b), prohibits misrepresentations; 
but, instead of prohibiting making an untrue statement, Section 
17(a)(2) prohibits obtaining money or property “by means of any 
untrue statement.”143 Despite this difference, split has developed 
among lower courts as to the applicability of Janus’s ultimate 
authority rule to Section 17(a)(2) enforcement actions brought by the 
SEC. 
The majority of courts confronted with the opportunity to import 
Janus’s interpretation of “make” to Section 17(a)(2)’s “by means of” 
language in SEC enforcement actions have declined the invitation.144 
For example, in SEC v. Stoker145 the defendant moved to dismiss the 
SEC’s Section 17(a)(2) claim, arguing, inter alia, that Janus applied to 
 
 142. Courts have interpreted the textual differences between Rules 10b-5(b) and Section 
17(a)(2) in a manner resulting in the latter capturing a broader range of conduct than the former 
even pre-Janus. See, e.g., SEC v. Stoker, 865 F. Supp. 2d 457, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (stating that 
Section 17(a)(2)’s language “plainly covers a broader range of activity” than does Rule 10b-
5(b)). Additionally, Section 17(a)(2) has long required only a showing of negligence, whereas a 
Rule 10b-5 violation requires a showing of scienter. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 701–02 (1980). 
Lastly, following Central Bank courts developed two primary tests for determining who made a 
statement within the meaning of 10b-5(b) so as to be liable as a primary participant. One such 
test, the bright-line attribution test, required that a statement be attributed to the party in order 
for that party to be a primary participant. See Pac. Mgmt. Co. v. Mayer Brown LLP, 603 F.3d 
144, 148 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Absent attribution, plaintiffs cannot show that they relied on 
defendants’ own false statements, and participation in creation of those statements amounts, at 
most, to aiding and abetting . . . .”). But see In re Software Toolworks, Inc. Sec. Litig., 50 F.3d 
615, 628–29 (9th Cir. 1994) (utilizing the alternative substantial participation test and allowing 
culpability for false statements where a party substantially participated in the preparation of the 
statements). 
 143. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2) (2012). 
 144. See, e.g., SEC v. Sentinel Mgmt. Grp., No. 07-C-4684, 2012 WL 1079961, at *15 (N.D. 
Ill. Mar. 20, 2012) (finding Janus inapplicable to Section 17(a) claims due to the differences in 
wording between Rule 10b-5 and Section 17(a), and because the policy concerns regarding 
implied private rights of action underlying Janus are not present in Section 17(a) actions); SEC 
v. Pentagon Capital Mgmt., 844 F. Supp. 2d 377, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Nor does Janus apply to 
SEC enforcement claims pursuant to Section 17(a) of the Securities Act.”), aff’d in part, vacated 
in part, 725 F.3d 279 (2d Cir. 2013); SEC v. Mercury Interactive, LLC, No. 5:07–cv–02822–
WHA, 2011 WL 5871020, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2011) (“This Court agrees with those 
decisions that have concluded that Janus may not be extended to statutes lacking the very 
language that Janus construed.”); SEC v. Geswein, No. 5:10CV1235, 2011 WL 4565861, at *2 
(N.D. Ohio Sept. 29, 2011) (declining to extend Janus to a Section 17(a) claim because the 
provision lacks the term “make”); SEC v. Daifotis, No. C 11–00137 WHA, 2011 WL 3295130, at 
*5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2011) (same). 
 145. SEC v. Stoker, 865 F. Supp. 2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
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claims brought under Section 17(a).146 The court, however, held 
otherwise for two main reasons, the first being textual, the second 
purposive. The court noted that proving a violation of Rule 10b-5 and 
Sections 17(a)(1)–(3) requires proof of essentially the same elements, 
but nonetheless concluded that differences in the language dictate 
different results.147 Although Janus undertook a textual analysis of the 
word “make,” concluding it means “to state,” Section 17(a)(2) 
prohibits obtaining money “by means of,” that is “by use,” of an 
untrue statement.148 Thus, according to the court, Section 17(a)(2)’s 
language “plainly covers a broader range of activity” than does Rule 
10b-5(b) because a defendant is liable under Section 17(a)(2) if he 
“obtains money or property by use of a false statement, whether 
prepared by himself or by another.”149 Second, the court highlighted 
that Janus’s ultimate authority rule resulted from the need to read 
Rule 10b-5 narrowly due to the concerns attendant to implied private 
rights of action.150 In contrast, Section 17(a)(2) does not give rise to 
such concerns because Section 17(a) does not support a private right 
of action, explicitly or implicitly.151 
Notwithstanding the absence of “make” in Section 17(a)(2), at 
least one court has held that Janus does in fact restrict the SEC’s 
enforcement authority under Section 17(a)(2).152 The first case to 
apply Janus to Section 17(a) of the Securities Act was SEC v. Kelly.153 
The court first acknowledged that the Supreme Court in Janus did 
not address liability under Section 17(a), but then noted that 
numerous courts have held that the elements of Section 17(a) and 
 
 146. Id. at 464. 
 147. Id. at 464–65 (citing Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695–97 (1980)). 
 148. Id. at 464 (citing SEC v. Tambone, 550 F.3d 106, 127 (1st Cir. 2008)). In Tambone, the 
First Circuit held that under Section 17(a)(2), “[l]iability attaches so long as the statement is 
used ‘to obtain money or property,’ regardless of its source.” Tambone, 550 F.3d at 127. 
 149. Stoker, 865 F. Supp. 2d at 465 (citing Tambone, 550 F.3d at 127). 
 150. Id. (citing Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 
(2011)). 
 151. Id. (citing Finkel v. Stratton Corp., 962 F.3d 169, 174 (2d Cir. 1992)). 
 152. See, e.g., SEC v. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d 340, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Because subsection 
(2) of Section 17(a) and subjection (b) of Rule 10b–5 are treated similarly, it would be 
inconsistent for Janus to require that a defendant have made the misleading statement to be 
liable under subsection (b) . . . but not under subsection (2) . . . .”); SEC v. Perry, No. CV-11-
1309 R, 2012 WL 1959566 at *8 (C.D. Cal. May 31, 2012) (citing Kelly with approval in finding 
that Janus applies to Section 17(a) claims). 
 153. SEC v. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). Strangely, the Stoker court’s only 
acknowledgement of Kelly’s earlier and opposite holding is a single “but see” citation. Stoker, 
865 F. Supp. 2d at 466. 
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Rule 10b-5 claims are “essentially the same.”154 The court further 
reasoned that “the SEC’s ‘only purpose’ in adopting Rule 10b-5 was 
to make the same prohibitions contained in Section 17(a)—which 
applies in connection with the ‘offer and sale’ of a security—
applicable to ‘purchasers’ of securities as well.”155 Although not 
directly addressing the absence of “make” in Section 17(a)’s text, the 
court broadly concluded that because Section 17(a) and Rule 10b-5 
are similarly focused they should be interpreted in the same manner 
with respect to the scope of primary liability.156 Because succeeding on 
a misrepresentation claim under either provision requires that “the 
SEC . . . prove the defendant made materially false statements or 
omissions,”157 inconsistency would result if the SEC had to prove that 
the defendant made the misleading statement per Janus in Rule 10b-5 
actions, but not have to prove that the defendant made the misleading 
statement per Janus in Section 17(a)(2) actions.158 As a result, the 
court essentially imported “make” into the Securities Act’s antifraud 
provision and dismissed the case because the SEC had not plead that 
the defendants made any misleading statements.159 
One aspect noticeably absent from the court’s analysis in Kelly is 
any consideration of the policy concerns that guided the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation in Janus, and whether such concerns are 
present when the SEC is the plaintiff.160 Not only are the concerns 
attendant to implied private rights of action—that is, judicial 
restraint, legislative primacy, and vexatious litigation—absent in SEC 
enforcement actions, but a court interpreting Section 17(a)(2) would 
have no need to interpret it narrowly to conform with private-action 
precedent as the Supreme Court did in Janus. Because Section 
 
 154. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d at 345 (citing SEC v. Monarch Funding Corp., 192 F.3d 295, 308 
(2d Cir. 1999); SEC v. First Jersey Sec. Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1467 (2d Cir. 1996); SEC v. Tex. Gulf 
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 855 n.22 (2d Cir. 1968); SEC v. Power, 525 F. Supp. 2d 415, 419 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007)). 
 155. Id. (citing Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir. 1952); Tex. Gulf 
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 855). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. (citing SEC v. McGinn, Smith & Co., 752 F. Supp. 2d 194, 212–13 (N.D.N.Y. 2010); 
SEC v. Glob. Telecom Servs., LLC, 325 F. Supp. 2d 94, 111 (D. Conn. 2004); SEC v. Espuelas, 
699 F. Supp. 2d 655, 659–63 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. See SEC v. Sentinel Mgmt. Grp., No. 07 C 4684, 2012 WL 1079961, at *15 (N.D. Ill. 
Mar. 20, 2012) (“However, the court in Kelly did not expressly consider the policy reasons 
underlying the Janus decision, and we are therefore unpersuaded by the court’s reasoning.”). 
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17(a)(2) does not include a private right of action, the provision need 
not be interpreted narrowly to preserve a reliance requirement. Nor 
is there a need to interpret it narrowly to preserve a previous 
prohibition on aiding-and-abetting liability given that the SEC is 
expressly authorized to pursue aiders and abettors of Section 17(a) 
primary violations.161 And though the SEC may need to prove that the 
defendant made materially false statements or omissions under both 
Section 17(a)(2) and Rule 10b-5(b), Section 17(a)(2)’s “by means of” 
language could, as the court in Stoker found, nonetheless be 
interpreted as covering a broader range of conduct than Rule 10b-
5(b)’s “make.” Just as the presence of “make” in Rule 10b-5(b) works 
to bind the SEC to Janus’s interpretation, the absence of “make” in 
Section 17(a)(2) saves the SEC from Janus’s constraints. 
Additionally, the court in Kelly was correct that “the SEC’s ‘only 
purpose’ in adopting Rule 10b-5 was to make the same prohibitions 
contained in Section 17(a)—which applies in connection with the 
‘offer and sale’ of a security—applicable to ‘purchasers’ of securities 
as well.”162 This recognition, however, should not have spurred the 
court to likewise constrain Section 17(a)(2) as Janus does Rule 10b-
5(b). Rather, this recognition better supports the previously stated 
idea that the Supreme Court interpreted “make” as it did to provoke 
the SEC or Congress into amending Rule 10b-5(b) to match the 
broader Section 17(a)(2). Rule 10b-5(b)’s roots in Section 17(a)(2) 
should not be taken for the opposite suggestion, that the latter should 
be interpreted to match the narrower formulation of the former. As 
shown below, Congress has been explicit in its preference for broad 
SEC enforcement authority. 
D. Janus’s Impact on the SEC’s Enforcement Authority Under 
Section 17(a)(2) and Congressional Intent 
Congress’s attitude towards both the SEC’s enforcement 
authority and the scope of implied private rights of action under the 
securities laws also bear on the issue. Congress has repeatedly 
expanded the SEC’s enforcement powers while simultaneously 
 
 161. See 15 U.S.C. § 77o(b) (2012) (“[A]ny person that knowingly or recklessly provides 
substantial assistance to another person in violation of a provision of this subchapter, or of any 
rule or regulation issued under this subchapter, shall be deemed to be in violation of such 
provision to the same extent” as the primary participant). 
 162. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d at 345 (citing Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 
463 (2d Cir. 1952); SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 855 (2d Cir. 1968)). 
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working, with the help of the Supreme Court, to limit the scope of 
private actions. This supports an inference that Congress would not 
want the SEC’s enforcement authority under Section 17(a)(2), which 
lacks both Rule 10b-5(b)’s language and the policy concerns that 
accompany private actions, to be limited by Janus. 
In 1990, Congress vastly augmented the SEC’s enforcement 
powers when it enacted the Securities Enforcement Remedies and 
Penny Stock Reform Act (Remedies Act)163 “in order to provide 
additional enforcement remedies for violations” of the federal 
securities laws.164 In particular, the Remedies Act was designed to 
“strengthen the enforcement powers of the . . . SEC and provide 
the agency with a broader range of remedies to protect investors and 
maintain the integrity of the nation’s securities markets.”165 Before the 
Remedies Act’s enactment, the SEC had limited authority to obtain 
financial penalties outside of insider-trading violations.166 Due to the 
perceived inadequacy of the SEC’s enforcement tools,167 the 
Remedies Act significantly expanded the sanctions available to the 
SEC168 by amending various federal securities laws169 to provide the 
SEC with four new classes of remedies: cease and desist authority, 
 
 163. Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 
101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 164. Id. at 931. For an in depth discussion of the Remedies Act, see generally Ralph C. 
Ferrara, Thomas A. Ferrigno & David S. Darland, Hardball! The SEC’s New Arsenal of 
Enforcement Weapons, 47 BUS. LAW. 33 (1991). For a look at postenactment developments, see 
generally Richard A. Spehr & Michelle J. Annunziata, The Remedies Act Turns Fifteen: What Is 
Its Relevance Today?, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 587 (2005).  
 165. S. REP. NO. 101-337, at 1 (1990). Likewise, the House Report for the Remedies Act 
stated it would provide the SEC “with new remedial authority that will enable the agency to 
operate its enforcement program in a more flexible manner.” H.R. REP. NO. 101-616, at 13 
(1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1379, 1380.  
 166. Spehr & Annunziata, supra note 164, at 588.  
 167. See Ferrara et al., supra note 164, at 35–36 (discussing the perceived limitations on SEC 
enforcement authority and stating that injunctions were “ineffective with respect to certain 
offenders and particularly onerous for others,” and disgorgement “merely required the 
wrongdoer to return the benefits of the illegal conduct and, thus, did not have a sufficient 
deterrent effect”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 101-616, at 16, as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1379, 
1384 (“Because many of the charges in the most prominent securities fraud cases of the 1980’s 
have involved violations other than insider trading, the Commission believes that it needs the 
additional authority contained in [the Remedies Act] to attack the full range of fraudulent 
activity in the securities markets.”).  
 168. Spehr & Annunziata, supra note 164, at 588. 
 169. These include the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2012); Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78nn (2012); Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (2012); and Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21 
(2012). 
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civil penalties, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, and officer and 
director bars.170 
Five years after significantly expanding the SEC’s enforcement 
authority, and one year after the Supreme Court held in a private 
action that Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 do not support aiding-and-
abetting liability, Congress acted yet again to expand the SEC’s 
enforcement power and also to curtail the reach of private securities 
litigation. Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act of 1995 (PSLRA)171 in an effort to deter frivolous securities class 
actions (that is, strike suits).172 The PSLRA heightened private 
plaintiffs’ pleading requirements173 and permitted the imposition of 
sanctions on attorneys who file securities-fraud class-action suits 
determined to be frivolous following mandatory judicial review of the 
suit.174 Significantly, Congress declined the former SEC Chairman’s 
request to provide for aiding-and-abetting liability in private Section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims following Central Bank,175 while 
 
 170. See Spehr & Annunziata, supra note 164, at 588–94 (explaining each class of new 
remedies). 
 171. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.). 
 172. See OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT TO THE 
PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS ON THE FIRST YEAR OF PRACTICE UNDER THE PRIVATE 
SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995, at 5–6 (stating that the PSLRA “was intended 
to address concerns that had been raised about abuses believed to be associated with securities 
class actions”); see also Sharon Nelles & Hilary Huber, Pleading Securities Fraud Claims: The 
Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 653, 653–54 (2014) (“The purpose of the 
PSLRA was to ‘prevent an onslaught of expensive and frivolous lawsuits when stock prices 
plummet, which could force corporations to settle meritless claims to avoid the expense of 
discovery and trial.’” (quoting In re Accelr8 Tech. Corp. Sec. Litig., 147 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1053–
54 (D. Colo. 2001))). 
 173. Nelles & Huber, supra note 172, at 656; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)(B) (2012) 
(requiring a plaintiff alleging securities fraud based on misleading statements or omissions of 
material facts to “specify each statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons 
why the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement or omission is 
made on information and belief, the complaint shall state with particularity all facts on which 
that belief is formed”). 
 174. Nelles & Huber, supra note 172, at 659 (“[T]he PSLRA requires courts to conduct a 
Rule 11 inquiry upon final adjudication of the suit. If the court determines that compliance with 
Rule 11 is lacking, then it must impose sanctions on the plaintiff for filing a frivolous suit.”). 
 175. See Private Right of Action Hearing, supra note 118, at 13–14 (statement of Arthur 
Levitt, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission) (“Legislation is also needed to restore 
aiding and abetting liability in private actions which are a necessary supplement to our overall 
enforcement program.”). 
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simultaneously bestowing upon the SEC the power to pursue such 
actors.176 
This decision demonstrates Congress’s preference for expansion 
of SEC enforcement authority over that of private litigants. Despite 
this preference, this decision also supports that reading cases such as 
Central Bank, Morrison, and Janus “as not limited to private 
litigation, notwithstanding extensive language to the contrary, may be 
becoming a habit.”177 That is, Congress likely provided the SEC with 
authority to pursue aiders and abettors in anticipation that Central 
Bank’s holding would be applied to constrain the scope of the SEC’s 
enforcement authority. The same is true of Congress providing the 
SEC with broader extraterritorial jurisdiction under Rule 10b-5 
following the Court’s interpretation of the Rule in Morrison as not 
reaching transactions occurring outside U.S. borders. Such inferred 
congressional acceptance of the applicability of Central Bank and 
Morrison to SEC enforcement actions suggests that Congress may 
view the Supreme Court’s textual interpretations of Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 in private actions as applying to SEC suits. By virtue of 
this precedent, Congress would likely view Janus’s textual 
interpretation of Rule 10b-5(b) as applying to SEC actions brought 
under the Rule because the same text is present. This same inference, 
though, cannot be drawn with regards to Janus’s applicability to 
Section 17(a)(2), which lacks the language that Congress could 
conclude binds the SEC by virtue of Janus. 
The PSLRA’s passage, however, shows that Congress 
nonetheless envisioned the availability to the SEC of a broad pool of 
primary participants to prosecute under the antifraud provisions. In 
Central Bank, the Court spoke to the reach of not only Section10(b), 
but also Rule 10b-5(b), stating that liability does not reach aiders and 
abettors because “the statute prohibits only the making of a material 
misstatement (or omission).”178 A primary participant is therefore one 
who “makes” a misrepresentation, at least in paragraph (b). This 
malleable formulation of what makes one a primary participant 
appears broader than Janus’s bright-line ultimate authority standard. 
Given that the aiding-and-abetting action still needs a primary 
 
 176. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 104, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2012); see 
also Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 158 (2008) 
(describing this history).  
 177. Langevoort, supra note 10, at 939.  
 178. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 177 
(1994). 
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participant, the provision for an aiding-and-abetting action for the 
SEC can be seen as predicated on Central Bank’s broader 
formulation of primary participants. Although Congress may have 
implicitly accepted Central Bank’s applicability to the SEC, Congress 
may nonetheless have envisioned a broad scope of liability for the 
aiding-and-abetting action due to the broad pool of primary 
participants Central Bank’s formulation established. Congress’s intent 
to provide a broad pool of primary participants from which aider-and-
abettor liability can be derived supports not extending Janus to 
Section 17(a)(2). 
Following the PSLRA’s enactment, Congress twice again 
declined an invitation to give private litigants the ability to sue aiders 
and abettors of primary violations of the federal securities laws while 
simultaneously expanding the SEC’s enforcement authority. First, in 
passing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley),179 
Congress denied aiding-and-abetting liability to private litigants180 but 
enhanced the remedies and sanctions available in SEC injunctive 
actions.181 Later, under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank),182 Congress considered and 
rejected a bill to extend primary liability to aiders and abettors183 
while expanding the SEC’s authority to prosecute such secondary 
actors under the Securities Act.184 Such a preference for the continued 
 
 179. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as 
amended in 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201–7266 and scattered sections of 11, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.). 
 180. See H.R. REP. NO. 107-414, at 53–54 (2002) (providing the minority view that 
“[a]lthough the [PSLRA] partially overturned the Central Bank of Denver decision by restoring 
some of the SEC’s authority to pursue aiders and abettors of securities fraud, that legislation 
failed to give the victims of fraud the right to sue those who aid issuers in misleading and 
defrauding the public”).  
 181. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2012) (permitting the SEC to freeze extraordinary 
payments to any of the listed persons during the course of a lawful investigation involving 
possible violations of the federal securities laws); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 305(a), 15 
U.S.C. § 78u (2012) (changing the standard for using officer and director bars in federal court 
actions from “substantial unfitness” to “unfitness”); id. § 308(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7246 (2012) 
(allowing the SEC to combine civil penalties with disgorgement funds). 
 182. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified in scattered titles of the U.S. Code) 
 183. See Liability for Aiding and Abetting Securities Violation Act of 2009, S. 1551, 111th 
Cong. (2009) (proposing a private civil right of action for aiding and abetting as part of Dodd-
Frank); Alexander C. Krueger-Wyman, Note, Making a Statement About Private Securities 
Litigation: The Merits and Implications of the Supreme Court’s Janus Capital Case, 98 VA. L. 
REV. 1621, 1639 (2014) (discussing the bill). 
 184. Dodd-Frank § 929M, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (2012) (providing the SEC authority to pursue 
aiders and abettors of violations of the Securities Act); see also id. § 929O, 15 U.S.C. § 78t 
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expansion of SEC authority to combat fraud under the securities laws 
intimates Congress’s intent not to have this authority narrowed by 
applying Janus to Section 17(a)(2). 
Finally, the SEC’s broad authority to obtain injunctions provides 
yet another factor suggesting that Congress intended for the SEC to 
have broader power than private litigants to pursue violations of the 
federal securities laws’ antifraud provisions.185 Unlike suits brought by 
private litigants, the purpose of an SEC injunctive proceeding “is to 
protect the public against harm, not punish the offender.”186 Also 
unlike private litigants seeking injunctive relief, the SEC typically is 
not required to demonstrate either irreparable injury or an 
inadequate remedy at law.187 Further still, the SEC need not even 
prove that the defendant engaged in prohibited conduct to obtain an 
injunction; the SEC must establish merely that the defendant was 
“about to engage in any of the acts or practice which constitute or will 
constitute a violation” of the antifraud provisions.188 Thus, not only 
does Section 17(a)(2) lack the language interpreted in Janus as 
narrowing the scope of primary-participant liability, the SEC’s 
injunctive authority itself evidences that Congress does not desire for 
the pool of primary participants pursuable by the SEC to equal that 
available to private litigants. 
IV.  RESTORING BALANCE IN THE SEC’S ENFORCEMENT 
AUTHORITY 
Given Janus’s applicability to Rule 10b-5(b) misrepresentation 
claims brought by the SEC,189 the question arises: What next? Claims 
 
(2012) (changing the aiding-and-abetting standard from “knowingly” to “knowingly or 
recklessly”). 
 185. See Securities Act of 1933 § 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (2012) (permitting the SEC to 
seek an injunction “[w]henever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is engaged in 
or about to engage in any of the acts or practice which constitute or will constitute a violation of 
any of the provisions of this chapter”); Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (2012) 
(same). 
 186. SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020, 1027–28 (2d Cir. 1978). 
 187. See, e.g., SEC v. Mgmt. Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 808 (2d Cir. 1975) (“Unlike 
private actions, which are rooted wholly in the equity jurisdiction of the federal court, SEC suits 
for injunctions are ‘creatures of statutes.’ ‘(P)roof of irreparable injury or the inadequacy of 
other remedies as in the usual suit for injunction’ is not required.” (alteration in original) 
(citation omitted)); see also SEC v. Marker, 427 F. Supp. 2d 583, 590 (M.D.N.C. 2006) (“[T]he 
Commission does not have to invoke the traditional equitable requirements for injunctive relief 
to obtain an injunction . . . .”). 
 188. 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (emphasis added). 
 189. See supra Part III.A. 
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brought under Section 17(a)(2) provide no alternative for prosecuting 
misrepresentations made in connection with the purchase of 
securities.190 And pursuing such misrepresentations under a theory of 
scheme liability via Rule 10b-5(a) and 10b-5(c) presents its own 
difficulties.191 Until recently, preserving the SEC’s ability to equally 
prosecute fraudsters during both the offer and purchase of securities 
appeared to require either congressional action, such as what 
occurred following Central Bank and Morrison, or the SEC’s exercise 
of its rulemaking authority. But in a recent agency adjudication the 
SEC interpreted its own regulations and the Securities Act in a 
manner that, if deferred to by courts, could alleviate this 
incongruence. 
A. The SEC’s Take: In re Matter of Flannery and the SEC’s Bid for 
Judicial Deference 
As could be expected, the SEC has not been silent on the issue, 
and for good reason. Extending Janus both to scheme liability claims 
under Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) and misrepresentation claims under 
Section 17(a)(2) would severely curtail the SEC’s ability to pursue 
perpetrators of misrepresentations at all stages of securities dealings. 
The stance taken by the SEC in a recent adjudication, however, 
drastically limits the possibility that Janus will be stretched beyond 
Rule 10b-5(b). 
In In re Matter of Flannery,192 the SEC squarely addressed Janus’s 
application to Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) and Section 17(a)(2). In its 
opinion, the Commission noted that Janus’s silence regarding these 
provisions “creat[ed] confusion in the lower courts as to whether its 
limitations apply to those provisions, as well.”193 The SEC thus relied 
on its “experience and expertise in administering the securities laws” 
to set out its interpretation both of Rule 10b-5’s various provisions 
and of Section 17(a).194 It did so to “resolve the ambiguities in the 
meaning of Rule 10b-5 and Section 17(a) that have produced 
confusion in the courts and inconsistencies across jurisdictions.”195 The 
 
 190. See supra Part III.C. 
 191. See supra Part III.B. 
 192. In re Flannery, Securities Act Release No. 9689, Exchange Act Release No. 73,840, 
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3981, Investment Company Act Release No. 31,374, 2014 
WL 7145625 (Dec. 15, 2014). 
 193. Id. at *10. 
 194. Id. at *9. 
 195. Id.  
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SEC’s allusion to ambiguity and its explicitness in bringing to bear its 
experience and expertise shows the SEC’s intent in setting out its 
interpretations—a bid for judicial deference to its stance that Janus 
does not apply to SEC actions brought outside Rule 10b-5(b). 
Under existing administrative-law doctrines, agencies receive 
deference for reasonable interpretations of ambiguities in their 
regulations and the statutes they administer.196 In In re Matter of 
Flannery, the SEC interpreted both its own regulations—Rule 10b-
5(a) and (c)—and a statute it is charged with administering—Section 
17(a)(2) of the Securities Act. By doing so, courts considering Janus’s 
application outside of Rule 10b-5(b) must now assess whether the 
SEC’s interpretations warrant deference. 
1. The SEC’s Take on Janus and Section 17(a)(2).  The SEC’s 
interpretation of Section 17(a)(2) might allow the SEC to avoid 
Janus’s ultimate authority rule when prosecuting fraud involving 
misrepresentations perpetrated in connection with the offer of 
securities. Under Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc.,197 federal courts must accept an agency’s reasonable 
construction of an ambiguous statute “even if the agency’s reading 
differs from what the court believes is the best statutory 
interpretation.”198 
In In re Flannery, the SEC concluded that “Janus’s limitation on 
primary liability under Rule 10b-5(b) does not apply to claims arising 
under Section 17(a)(2).”199 It did so based on the same rationale 
employed by the many courts that similarly held Janus inapplicable to 
Section 17(a)(2). First, Section 17(a)(2) prohibits obtaining money or 
property “by means of” any untrue statement, not “making” a false 
statement.200 This textual difference means Section 17(a)(2) “covers a 
 
 196. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 457 (1997) (declaring that because Congress had not 
directly spoken to the issue, the agency’s interpretation was to be sustained if it was based on a 
permissible construction of the statute); Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (holding that if a court determines that Congress has not directly 
addressed the precise question at issue, the court must ask whether the agency’s interpretation 
is a permissible construction of the statute); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 
414 (1945) (explaining that the administrative interpretation of a regulation is controlling unless 
plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation).  
 197. Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 198. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005) 
(citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44, 44 n.11.). 
 199. Flannery, 2014 WL 7145625, at *11 (citation omitted).  
 200. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2) (2012)). 
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broader range of activity than Rule 10b-5(b).”201 Indeed, the SEC 
interpreted Section 17(a)(2)’s “by means of” requirement “to mean 
that a defendant may be held primarily liable if he uses a 
misstatement to obtain money or property even if he has not himself 
made a false statement in connection with the offer or sale of a 
security.”202 Second, the SEC reasoned that since “make” is absent 
from Section 17(a)(2), “Janus’s limitation on primary liability under 
Rule 10b-5(b) does not apply to claims arising under Section 
17(a)(2).”203 Finally, extending Janus to Section 17(a)(2) would 
undermine the Securities Act’s remedial purposes and the SEC’s 
“long-held position that the securities laws ‘should be construed not 
technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate [those] remedial 
purposes.’”204 
Judicial deference to the SEC’s interpretation of Section 17(a)(2) 
will ensure that Janus does not constrain its ability to prosecute fraud 
involving misrepresentations perpetrated in connection with the offer 
of securities. Deferring to this interpretation will not, however, 
remedy the constraint Janus placed on the SEC’s ability to prosecute 
misrepresentations perpetrated in connection with the purchase of 
those securities on the secondary markets. 
2. The SEC’s Take on Janus and Scheme Liability Under Rule 
10b-5(a) and (c).  In Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.,205 the 
Supreme Court held that an agency’s interpretation of its own rules 
“becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or 
inconsistent with the regulation.”206 In In re Flannery, the SEC 
interpreted Rule 10b-5(a) and (c), its own rules, and concluded that 
primary liability under those provisions “also encompasses the 
‘making’ of a fraudulent misstatement to investors, as well as the 
drafting or devising of such a misstatement.”207 This is because, 
according to the SEC, Rule 10b-5(a) and (c)’s combined prohibitions 
 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. (quoting SEC v. Tambone, 550 F.3d 106, 127–28 (1st Cir. 2008)). 
 203. Id.  
 204. Id. (alteration in original).  
 205. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945).  
 206. Id. at 413–14; see also Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (stating that an 
agency’s interpretation of its own regulation contained in an amicus brief is “controlling unless 
plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation” (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley 
Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989))). 
 207. Flannery, 2014 WL 7145625, at *12.  
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on employment of deceptive “device[s],” “scheme[s],” and “artifice[s] 
to defraud” and deceptive “act[s]” includes “making” a 
misstatement.208 Thus, under the SEC’s interpretation, a party could 
avoid primary liability for a misstatement under Rule 10b-5(b) if he 
did not “make” the statement as defined in Janus but nonetheless be 
primarily liable under subsections (a) and (c) for employing a 
deceptive “device,” “scheme,” or “artifice to defraud” and engaging 
in a deceptive “act.”209 This approach permits the SEC to avoid 
Janus’s constraints when prosecuting fraud involving misstatements 
or omissions in the purchase or sale of securities on the secondary 
markets. 
Although a full-blown administrative-law analysis of this 
interpretation’s chances of receiving deference is beyond the scope of 
this Note, one potential speed bump warrants mentioning: Seminole 
Rock deference may soon be dead. Justices Scalia and Thomas both 
recently expressed their desire to altogether jettison deference to 
agency interpretations of their own regulations.210 Justice Alito and 
Chief Justice Roberts also believe that reconsideration of Seminole 
Rock/Auer deference may be appropriate when properly raised and 
argued.211 As Chief Justice Roberts put it, the Court’s recent decisions 
have assured that “[t]he bar is aware that there is some interest in 
reconsidering those cases.”212 Now “[w]ell-advised litigants pained by 
agency interpretations . . . will be teeing up the Auer question and, 
when it makes tactical sense, arguing that agency interpretations 
really are substantive rules” to which courts do not defer.213 If 
 
 208. See id. at *14 (“It would require a wholly arbitrary reading of those terms to construe 
them as excluding the making, drafting, or devising of a misstatement.”). 
 209. See id. at *13 (“Accepting that a drafter is not primarily liable for ‘making’ a 
misstatement under Rule 10b-5(b), our position is that the drafter would be primarily liable 
under subsections (a) and (c) for employing a deceptive ‘device’ and engaging in a deceptive 
‘act’.”). 
 210. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1213 (2015) (Thomas J., concurring) 
(“I write separately because [these cases at hand] call into question the legitimacy of our 
precedents requiring deference to administrative interpretations of regulations.”); id. at 1211–13 
(Scalia J., concurring) (describing that in interpreting regulations, “courts [should] decide—with 
no deference to the agency—whether [the agency’s] interpretation is correct”). 
 211. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1338 (2013). 
 212. Id. at 1339. 
 213. Brian Wolfman & Bradley Girard, Opinion Analysis: The Court Slays the D.C. Circuit’s 
Paralyzed Veterans Doctrine, Leaving Bigger Issues for Another Day, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 10, 
2015, 9:22 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/03/opinion-analysis-the-court-slays-the-d-c-
circuits-paralyzed-veterans-doctrine-leaving-bigger-issues-for-another-day [http://perma.cc/G5
CJ-632V]. 
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Seminole Rock/Auer deference is extinguished, the SEC’s 
interpretation of Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) as unaffected by Janus may 
not carry the day. If it does not, the SEC would be back to having a 
curtailed ability to pursue misstatements and omissions during the 
purchase of securities on the secondary markets. This possibility calls 
for exploration of alternative routes to alleviating Janus constraints. 
B. Restoring Balance via the SEC’s Rulemaking Authority Under 
Section 10(b) 
Given the current congressional environment of partisan 
gridlock,214 the most plausible means of restoring balance in the SEC’s 
authority to prosecute misrepresentations at the varying stages of 
securities dealings is through the SEC’s rulemaking authority. Given 
that Janus’s applicability to SEC enforcement actions stems from the 
presence of “make” in Rule 10b-5(b) regardless of the plaintiff’s 
identity, the SEC could reverse Janus’s detrimental effects on 
pursuing primary participants by amending its own rule.215 
Importantly, Janus did not constrain the scope of Section 10(b)—and 
thus the SEC’s ability to promulgate rules under that Section—since 
the opinion interpreted the text of Rule 10b-5 itself and not the 
statutory language of Section 10(b).216 In deciding to bring its 
misrepresentation enforcement powers into equilibrium through 
exercising this rulemaking authority, the SEC has two options. The 
Commission can simply amend the current Rule 10b-5(b) and discard 
“make” in favor of a preferable term. Or it can leave intact the 
current narrow Rule 10b-5(b) and create a new Rule 10b-5(b) to 
explicitly apply only to SEC enforcement actions. 
 
 214. See Gillian E. Metzger, Appointments, Innovation, and the Judicial-Political Divide, 64 
DUKE L.J. 1607, 1630–33 (2015) (“Political scientists have documented significantly increased 
political polarization in Congress. The ideological gap between the two parties is growing, with 
increasingly consistent party divides across a wide range of policy issues.”). Such polarization 
makes “periods of divided government especially prone to conflict and stalemate.” Id. at 1632 
(citation omitted). 
 215. The SEC has used its rulemaking authority in the past to essentially overrule a line of 
cases interpreting Rule 10b-5. In 2000, the SEC promulgated Rule 10b5-1 to clarify whether 
insider trading prohibited by Rule 10b-5 required knowing possession of material nonpublic 
information, or using such information to trade. The SEC settled on the former interpretation in 
Rule 10b5-1, overruling the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits’ approach requiring use of the 
information. See JAMES D. COX & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 
CASES AND MATERIALS 948–49 (11th ed. 2014). 
 216. See Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011) 
(“For purposes of Rule 10b–5, the maker of a statement is the person or entity with ultimate 
authority over the statement . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
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1. Reversing Janus’s Effects by Amending Rule 10b-5(b).  The 
more interesting route for the SEC to take is to amend the current 
Rule 10b-5(b), resulting in a newly phrased single rule applicable to 
both the SEC and private litigants. Given Rule 10b-5(b)’s roots, the 
SEC could amend Rule 10b-5(b)’s language to track that of the 
broader Section 17(a)(2), from which Rule 10b-5(b) was substantially 
derived.217 This response would accord with the assertion that, given 
Rule 10b-5(b)’s creation, the Court in Janus so interpreted Rule 10b-
5(b) to provoke the SEC into acting to bring its enforcement 
authority under Rule 10b-5 up to par with that of its parent, Section 
17(a).218 
Simply amending the current Rule 10b-5(b) carries with it the 
primary benefit of preserving private enforcement as a “necessary 
supplement to the securities fraud deterrence efforts of the SEC.”219 
That is, a Rule 10b-5(b) that captures the same scope of primary 
participants regardless of the plaintiff’s identity allows the threat of 
private litigation to serve as an added deterrent to those considering 
engaging in fraudulent conduct. Amending the current Rule 10b-5(b) 
to track the language of Section 17(a)(2) would therefore relieve the 
SEC of Janus’s constraints on pursuing primary violators while 
supplementing this broader enforcement authority with the 
deterrence provided by the specter of private litigation. Indeed, that 
the SEC’s amicus brief in Janus argued for a broad interpretation of 
“make” hints at the SEC is content with a single rule applicable to 
both itself and private plaintiffs.220 Even before Janus the SEC 
recommended to Congress that aiding-and-abetting liability be 
established in private claims following Central Bank,221 which would 
have permitted both the SEC and private plaintiffs to pursue such 
actors. 
 
 217. See supra notes 131–32 and accompanying text. 
 218. See supra Part III.A. 
 219. Rose, supra note 99, at 1301. For an argument that private enforcement results in 
detrimental overdeterrence, see generally id. 
 220. See Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 12–17, Janus, 131 S. 
Ct. 2296 (2011) (No. 09-525), 2010 WL 4339892 (explaining the agency’s view that a person 
makes a statement if “the statement is written or spoken by him, or if he provides the false or 
misleading information that another person then puts into the statement, or if he allows the 
statement to be attributed to him” (citation omitted)); see also Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2303 & n.8 
(explaining that the SEC definition would permit private plaintiffs to sue a person who provides 
false information). 
 221. Private Right of Action Hearing, supra note 118, at 13–14 (statement of Arthur Levitt, 
Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission).  
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But taking this path to reversing Janus’s adverse effects also 
eschews the notion that Congress prefers that the SEC enjoy broader 
enforcement authority than do private litigants even when the actions 
are brought under identical provisions.222 In this regard, the SEC 
might alternatively preserve the current Rule 10b-5(b) interpreted in 
Janus but also promulgate a new Rule 10b-5(b) that explicitly applies 
only to the SEC. 
2. Reversing Janus’s Effects by Adopting a New Rule 10b-5(b) 
Applicable Only to SEC Enforcement Actions.  Promulgating a new 
Rule 10b-5(b) exclusive to the SEC would not only honor Congress’s 
apparent desire to constrain the scope of private securities actions 
while broadening the SEC’s enforcement authority, but also pander 
to the Supreme Court’s concerns over implied private rights of action 
and its desire to ensure such actions remain narrowly construed.223 
Moreover, this two-rule approach would alleviate the tension 
following cases brought by private plaintiffs that produce 
disagreement as to their applicability to SEC enforcement actions. 
The Supreme Court and lower courts could freely construe the 
current Rule 10b-5(b), applicable to private actions, narrowly while 
interpreting the new Rule 10b-5(b), applicable to SEC actions, “not 
technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial 
purposes.”224 
C. Restoring Balance via Congressional Action 
Congressional action provides an alternative—but also less 
likely—means of restoring balance in the SEC’s enforcement 
authority with regards to misrepresentations under the securities 
antifraud provisions. Indeed, it would not be the first time Congress 
has acted to rebalance the SEC’s enforcement authority following the 
Supreme Court’s textual interpretation of the Exchange Act’s 
antifraud provisions. For example, following the Court’s abrogation 
of aiding-and-abetting liability in Central Bank, Congress quickly 
 
 222. See supra Part III.D. 
 223. See, e.g., Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302 (“[C]oncerns with the judicial creation of a private 
cause of action caution against its expansion.” (quoting Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. 
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 165 (2008))); see also id. (“[W]e are mindful that we must 
give ‘narrow dimensions . . . to a right of action Congress did not authorize when it first enacted 
the statute and did not expand when it revisited the law.’” (alterations in original) (quoting 
Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 167)). 
 224. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963). 
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affirmed the SEC’s ability to pursue such actors.225 On that occasion 
Congress acted with good reason because application of Central 
Bank’s holding to the SEC would bar the Commission from obtaining 
injunctive relief against aiders and abettors.226 Such a result would be 
a “strange anomaly” in that “the Commission’s enforcement powers 
would, under the express language of the Act, be broader in actions 
brought in an administrative proceeding . . . than if the same action 
were initiated in the district court” seeking injunctive relief.227 But the 
PSLRA, “by expressly authorizing SEC judicial enforcement of the 
antifraud provision against aiders and abettors, avoids the 
anomal[y].”228 
The post-Janus imbalance in the SEC’s authority to pursue as 
primary participants those who materially misrepresent information 
in connection with the offer of securities versus those who do so in 
connection with the purchase of securities on the secondary markets 
parallels the anomalous result of applying Central Bank to the SEC. It 
likewise could be avoided by congressional action reversing Janus’s 
narrow holding as applied to the SEC. Given the substantial 
institutional constraints on congressional action, and the current 
bitterly partisan state of Congress in general, times do not appear 
conducive to such remedial action.229 Thus, judicial deference to the 
SEC’s interpretation of scheme liability under Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) 
or the SEC utilizing its rulemaking authority are the more plausible 
solutions to Janus’s incongruence quandary. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the ultimate authority rule being molded to allay 
concerns present only in private actions and to mesh seamlessly with 
precedent not applicable to the SEC, “make” does not disappear 
from Rule 10b-5(b) when the SEC is the plaintiff. To that end, Janus’s 
ultimate authority rule, whether intended or as a result of collateral 
damage, constrains the scope of actors the SEC can prosecute as 
 
 225. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 104, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2012) 
(reestablishing aiding-and-abetting liability). 
 226. See Cox, supra note 41, at 537 (discussing the effects of applying Central Bank to the 
SEC). 
 227. Id. at 537, 539. 
 228. Id. at 539. 
 229. See Metzger, supra note 214, at 1630–33 (considering how the combination of divided 
government and political polarization render government “especially prone to conflict and 
stalemate” (citation omitted)). 
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primary participants under that provision. The Supreme Court’s 
puzzling methodology is plausibly explained as an attempt to prompt 
the SEC or Congress into bringing Rule 10b-5(b) and Section 
17(a)(2) into equilibrium with one another. After all, Rule 10b-5 is 
derived substantially from Section 17(a) and was meant to serve the 
same purpose. The SEC has taken notice, and perhaps the courts will 
defer to its interpretation of scheme liability under Rule 10b-5(a) and 
(c) as reaching the claims foreclosed by Janus. If not, either the SEC 
or Congress may need to take additional action to resolve this 
incongruence. 
 
